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 The issue of extraordinary measures remains an area that is largely un-
explored in Polish legal science. This is probably due to fact that the constitu-
tional norms concerning these institutions have thus far not required practi-
cal application. However, this is no reason why the issue cannot be investi-
gated and discussed. Legal science should be of service to society, for example 
by clarifying important issues related to the existence of specific binding legal 
solutions. In the case of extraordinary measures, which, by their nature, are 
only used in extreme situations, it is therefore the role of legal science to re-
solve any pertinent problems in advance so that, should the time come to 
apply them, the State authorities can take appropriate action without hin-
drance. Prior abstract analysis of this issue in the doctrine should also make 
it possible to form an objective assessment of the actions taken within the 
framework of extraordinary measures, which could otherwise be distorted by 
political sympathies and a subjective attitude to the dangers faced by society. 
 In the light of the above, it seems appropriate for legal science to reflect on 
the regulations on extraordinary measures, understood as legal acts that 
affect the validity and content of particular extraordinary measures.1 The 
aim of this article is to identify all the types of such regulations, to recon-
struct the elements of their content, to define their legal nature and to dis-
cuss the implications for the supervision of their lawfulness. In order to do so, 
the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland2 and relevant acts 





                                                 
* Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister of Science and 
Higher Education as part of agreement no. 848/P-DUN/2018. Translated by Stephen Dersley. 
1 The content of extraordinary measures should be understood as specific norms concerning 
the functioning of public authorities and the freedoms and rights of the person and citizen that 
are in force while the extraordinary measures apply. 
2 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws of the Republic 
of Poland [JL RP] No. 78, item 483 as amended (hereinafter: the Constitution). 
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II. THE TYPES OF REGULATIONS ON EXTRAORDINARY 
MEASURES  
 
 Article 228 sec. 2 of the Constitution provides that extraordinary 
measures may only be introduced by regulation. The Constitution also uses 
this concept in its other provisions, referring to certain normative acts as 
such. This applies to implementing regulations (Article 92) and regulations 
having the force of statute (Article 234). These are clearly legal acts with 
characteristics different to those of extraordinary measures. Implementing 
regulations are issued only for the purpose of implementing statutes and on 
the basis of a detailed authorization specified therein, which indicates the 
organ competent to issue the regulation, the scope of matters to be regulated 
and guidelines concerning its provisions. The regulations that introduce ex-
traordinary measures do not meet these requirements—their authorisation is 
of a general nature and its purpose is not to regulate a certain category of 
matters. Similarly, it does not have the characteristic possessed by regula-
tions having the force of statute, the essence of which is the modification of 
ordinary legislation. This means that the constitutional legislators assigned 
an autonomous meaning to the term ‘regulation’ referred to in Article 228 sec. 
2 of the Constitution—it is, unlike other regulations, an act of applying the 
law.3 
 The Constitution explicitly mentions only one regulation of this type, 
namely regulations on the introduction of extraordinary measures. It seems, 
however, that it is possible to deduce from the content of the provisions of the 
Constitution as many as three other types. The first are regulations on the 
extension of extraordinary measures. 4 The Constitution provides for the pos-
sibility of such extensions in Article 230 sec. 2 and Article 232, sentence 2. 
The former provision states: ‘Extension of a state of emergency may be made 
once only for a period no longer than 60 days and with the consent of the 
Sejm’. On the other hand, Article 232, sentence 2 indicates that the extension 
of a state of natural disaster ‘may be made with the consent of the Sejm’. The 
Constitution specifies neither the organs authorised to extend the extraordi-
nary measures, nor the legal form in which such an extension is to take place. 
However, there should be no doubt that these norms should be interpreted as 
concerning extraordinary measures, and thus their extension should follow 
similar rules. Therefore, the organs authorized for this purpose are the Coun-
cil of Ministers (in the case of a natural disaster) and the President of the 
Republic of Poland acting at the request of the Council of Ministers (in the 
case of a state of emergency). The extension of extraordinary measures 
should take the form of a regulation and not a resolution of the Council of 
Ministers or  a Presidential decree  (which could be  suggested  by  a literal in 
 
                                                 
3 See K. Działocha, Uwagi do art. 87, in: L. Garlicki (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Pol-
skiej. Komentarz, vol. 1, Warsaw 1999: 3–4. This does not rule out the fact that it also has the 
characteristics of a normative act. This issue will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
4 See K. Działocha, Uwagi do art. 228, in: L. Garlicki (ed), op. cit., vol. 5, Warsaw 2005: 6. 




terpretation of Article 142 sec. 2 of the Constitution5). Consistent with this 
interpretation are the provisions of Article 5 sec. 1 of the Act on States of 
Emergency6 and Article 6 sec. 1 of the Act on the State of Natural Disaster,7 
in which it is explicitly stated that the extension of extraordinary measures 
occurs by way of regulation.8 
 From constitutional provisions it is also possible to infer the admissibility 
of issuing regulations on the termination of extraordinary measures.9 Alt-
hough the Constitution does not explicitly provide for them, their existence is 
a logical consequence of the existence of some of its norms. In this context, 
first of all it is important to draw attention to the content of Article 229, on 
martial law, which, unlike the norms concerning other extraordinary 
measures, is silent on the issue of the maximum duration of martial law. 
Although this conception of constitutional provisions is to some extent impre-
cise, it must be interpreted as meaning that it is only possible to introduce 
martial law for an indefinite period of time.10 The consequence of this is the 
need for there to be a formal mechanism for terminating martial law. It does 
not seem that such an important issue, so closely tied to the constitutional 
competence to implement it, has been left to the free regulation of the ordi-
nary legislator11—and thus all the relevant elements of this mechanism 
should be reconstructed on the basis of constitutional norms. Analysis of 
these norms leads to one unambiguous conclusion, namely that since the 
President and the Council of Ministers are the organs that decide on the du-
ration of martial law, the matter of its termination must remain their sole 
responsibility. Analogously, since martial law is introduced by a regulation, 
its legal effects, in the absence of precise norms, can only be revoked by a 
legal act of the same kind, and therefore also by a regulation. This interpre-
tation was expressed by the ordinary legislator in Article 8 sec. 1 of the 
Act  on  Martial  Law,12  in  which  it  is  stated  that  martial  law  shall  be  
                                                 
5 This provision states that: ‘The President of the Republic shall issue decisions within the 
scope of discharge of his other authorities’ [i.e. other than issuing implementing regulations and 
executive orders—M.R.]  
6 The Act of 21 June 2002, on States of Emergency [Ustawa o stanie wyjątkowym], JL RP 
2017, item. 1928. 
7 The Act of 18 April 2002, On the State of Natural Disaster [Ustawa o stanie klęski 
żywiołowej], JL RP 2017, item. 1897. 
8 It should be emphasized here that the ordinary legislator only elaborated the constitutional 
norms in this respect. This issue has to be classified as a constitutional matter, and therefore it 
was not submitted to the ordinary legislator for free regulation. 
9 See K. Działocha, Uwagi do art. 228: 6. 
10 Since the Constitution regulates the duration of a state of emergency and a state of natural 
disaster, this issue should be classed as a constitutional matter. The issue of the duration of 
martial law was therefore not submitted to the ordinary legislator for regulation. In order to 
avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, Article 229 of the Constitution could explicitly indicate 
that ‘the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, declare a state of 
martial law for an indefinite period’. 
11 Here the term ‘ordinary legislator’ is used to distinguish this legislator from the ‘constitu-
tional legislator’. 
12 The Act of 29 August 2002, on Martial Law and on the Competences of the Supreme Com-
mander of the Armed Forces and the Principles of its Subordination to the Organs of the Repub-
lic of Poland [Ustawa o stanie wojennym oraz o kompetencjach Naczelnego Dowódcy Sił Zbro-
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terminated ‘by the President of the Republic, at the request of the Council of 
Ministers, by regulation’. 
 Although other extraordinary measures are introduced for a fixed period 
of time, the Constitution determines implicitly that it is necessary for there 
to be formal mechanisms for their termination before the expiry of the period  
for which they have been introduced. This follows from Article 228 sec. 1 of 
the Constitution, according to which extraordinary measures shall be intro-
duced only ‘in situations of particular danger, if ordinary constitutional 
measures are inadequate’. If, therefore, before a state of emergency or a state 
of natural disaster has actually come into force, ‘ordinary constitutional 
measures’ prove adequate for counteracting the danger (or the danger has 
already been averted), there is a constitutional obligation to terminate the 
extraordinary measures.13 As with the case of martial law, this should be 
executed by the organs equipped with the competence to announce the intro-
duction of such measures, and it should be executed by way of a regulation. 
Thus, in Article 5 sec. 2 of the Act on Extraordinary Measures and Article 6 
sec. 2 of the Act on the State of Natural Disaster, the ordinary legislator has 
also properly elaborated on constitutional norms. 
 The fourth type of regulation consists of regulations amending regulations 
on the introduction of emergency measures. These are not expressly provided 
for either in the Constitution or in ordinary legislation, but their existence 
derives indirectly from the provisions in force. If, to anticipate later consider-
ations, one necessary element of emergency measures is to define permissible 
limitations on freedoms and human rights, it could be the case that this issue 
will be regulated incorrectly in the regulation on emergency measures—for 
example the anticipated limitations on freedoms and rights might prove to be 
insufficient. It is difficult to believe that in such a situation the state would 
remain helpless or that it would be necessary to resort to the doctrine of the 
state of necessity.14 It should be supposed that it would be possible to amend 
the provisions of the regulation introducing emergency measures accordingly. 
There should be no doubt that this could only be done in the form of a regula-
tion issued by the same organs that introduced the extraordinary measures. 
Where the Constitution provides for the Sejm’s supervision over the introduc-
tion of the extraordinary measures, it is necessary that the amending regula-
tion in question also be placed under the Sejm’s supervision.15 Since such an 
act enters into force before the Sejm adopts the relevant resolution, it must  
                                                                                                                         
jnych i zasadach jego podległości konstytucyjnym organom Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej], JL RP 
2017, item. 1932. 
13 It is worth noting that this provision also imposes the obligation to terminate the extraor-
dinary measures (including martial law) in areas where they are no longer necessary, even if it is 
necessary for them to be in force in other parts of the country. 
14 For more detailed discussion on this issue, see K. Wojtyczek, Konieczność jako legitymiza-
cja działań władzy w demokratycznym państwie prawnym, Państwo i Prawo 1994, issue 9: 39–
49. 
15 Otherwise, constitutional provisions would be circumvented. Since the subject of control of 
the Sejm is the entire regulation introducing the extraordinary measures, it adjudicates not only 
on the need to introduce such measures, but also the admissibility of using the means that the 
President, on the government’s behest, specified in the regulation. 




be assumed that its repeal would have ‘reanimation’ effects and would thus 
restore the legal status prior to the amendment.16 However, it does not seem 
that a regulation amending a regulation on the introduction of a state of nat-
ural disaster should be subject to such supervision, in the event that the state 
has already been extended with the consent of the Sejm. This is due to the 
fact that the Constitution only subjects the very fact of the extension of this 
state to the supervision of the Sejm. A regulation that extends a state of dis-
aster is not a self-existent act, in the sense that its essence is limited solely to 
extending the previous regulation introducing these extraordinary measures.  
 The possibility of amending the regulations which introduce extraordinary 
measures is also supported by Article 228 sec. 5 of the Constitution, according 
to which all actions taken as a result of the introduction of the extraordinary 
measures shall be proportionate to the degree of threat. Thus, if the limita-
tions on freedoms and rights provided for in the extraordinary measures 
prove to be too radical, there is a constitutional obligation to amend the regu-
lation so that it allows only those forms of limitations on rights and freedoms 
that are necessary to counteract the threat. 
 At this juncture it is worth mentioning that such a regulation, since it was 
not expressly provided for in legal provisions, should only be issued when it is 
necessary to modify the scope of permissible limitations on freedoms and 
rights. In the event that it proves necessary to extend the extraordinary 
measures to areas other than the original one, the relevant State organs 
should rather adopt a regulation introducing (parallel) extraordinary 
measures in these areas. Similarly, as has already been indicated, when it is 
no longer necessary to maintain extraordinary measures in a given part of 
the national territory, a regulation terminating the extraordinary measures 
in these areas should be adopted, rather than a regulation amending the reg-
ulation that introduced the extraordinary measures. 
 
 
III. THE CONTENT OF THE REGULATIONS 
ON EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 
 
 The second research problem indicated in the introduction is the recon-
struction of the content of the aforementioned regulations. It appears that 
this issue has been regulated at the constitutional level. According to Article 
228 sec. 3 of the Constitution, the essence of extraordinary measures is the 
modification of the principles for activity by organs of public authority as well 
as the degree to which the freedoms and rights may be subject to limitation. 
However, as provided for in Article 228 sec. 5, emergency measures must be 
proportionate to the degree of threat. The combination of these two norms 
leads to the conclusion that out of all the specific principles for activity by  
                                                 
16 Otherwise, the Sejm’s control over the extraordinary measures would be meaningless, 
since its repeal would not lead to the withdrawal of the effects that the measure caused in the 
sphere of law (see the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 21 March 2000, K 4/99, OTK ZU 
2000, no. 2, item 65, in which the Constitutional Tribunal similarly justified the existence of the 
‘reanimation’ effect of some of its rulings on amending provisions). 
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organs of public authorities and limitations of freedoms and rights in specific 
extraordinary measures, only those which are necessary may be applied. It is 
therefore necessary to formally concretize statutory norms for the needs of 
given extraordinary measures. The only instrument that can be used for this 
purpose is the very regulation introducing these measures. The Constitution 
therefore determines that the necessary elements of such a regulation are at 
least the principles for activity by organs  
of public authority17 and limitations on freedoms and rights selected from the 
provisions of the Act on Extraordinary Measures.18 
 The legislation currently in force only partially meets this requirement. In 
Article 3 sec. 2 of the Act on Martial Law, Article 3 sec. 2 of the Act on States 
of Emergency and Article 5 sec. 2 of the Act on Natural Disasters, it is stated 
that the regulation introducing extraordinary measures only defines the 
scope of permissible limitations of freedoms and rights. Thus, the admissibil-
ity of applying any specific principles for activity by organs of public authori-
ty is assumed in advance, which should be assessed negatively from the point 
of view of the constitutional solutions analysed above. 
 The second obligatory element of any emergency measure is undoubtedly 
the specification of its territorial scope. This ensues clearly from the provi-
sions of the Constitution, which explicitly state that all extraordinary 
measures (including martial law) may be introduced in a part of or upon the 
whole territory of the State. Ordinary legislation does not specify these norms 
and, in particular, does not specify how to describe the territory in which 
emergency measures are introduced. This entails that it is necessary to have 
recourse to the general provisions on the territorial division of the State. 
Thus, the President or the Council of Ministers are obliged to describe the 
territory in which the extraordinary measures are to be in force, by indicating 
in the content of the regulation the names of the basic territorial units where 
the measures are to apply. This should be done in the simplest possible way, 
such as by indicating the largest possible units (e.g. voivodeships). The indi-
cation of smaller units should only be done when the extraordinary measures 
are not implemented to the full extent in the larger territorial unit. Theoreti-
cally, it may be problematic to describe the emergency measures if they are to 
be in force in an area smaller to than a municipality (gmina). In practice, 
however, such a situation should not arise. A threat that may justify the im-
position of extraordinary measures ought to, in terms of its extent, threaten 
much larger areas than a single municipality, let alone a part of it. However, 
if reality were to prove this thesis wrong, it seems that one rational solution 
would be to divide the municipality into smaller component units (such as 
districts, housing estates).  
  
                                                 
17 For an alternative view, see  K. Prokop, Stany nadzwyczajne w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, Białystok 2005: 28. 
18 See K. Działocha, Uwagi do art. 231, in: L. Garlicki (ed.), op. cit., vol. 4, Warsaw 2005: 1. 




 It is worth pointing out here that there are no grounds for requiring the 
area covered by the extraordinary measures to be designated in the regula-
tion in an additional graphic form. However, this is certainly not prohibited. 
On the other hand, such a designation on its own, without the boundaries 
being described in words, could in practice give rise to some problems—
especially with regard to the status of the areas surrounding the boundary 
line of the area where the extraordinary measures are in force. This type of 
solution should therefore be rejected. 
 The third element of these regulations is the indication of the time period 
during which the extraordinary measures will be in place. However, as was 
mentioned, this does not apply to martial law, which is always to be imposed 
for an indefinite period of time. In the case of the remaining two extraordi-
nary measures, the Constitution precisely specifies their maximum initial 
length, namely 90 days in the case of states of emergency (Article 230 sec. 1) 
and 30 days in the case of a state of natural disaster (Article 232, sentence 1). 
These norms also indicate how the duration of extraordinary measures 
should be described: the only applicable unit are days. This is also due to the 
fact that it would be difficult to describe the expected duration of such 
measures by means of more precise units, such as hours. On the other hand, 
the use of units such as weeks or months could introduce unnecessary chaos, 
all the more so because the duration of a natural disaster or state of emer-
gency would typically be short, and thus the use of days simply seems natural 
and optimal. 19 
 It is doubtful whether, from the point of view of the Constitution, it is nec-
essary to provide at least a brief description of the reasons for the introduc-
tion of extraordinary measures in the relevant regulations. It seems that 
such a norm can be interpreted through consideration of the nature its regu-
lation. In addition to its legal function, to some extent such regulations also 
play a symbolic20 and informative role, which is reflected in the constitutional 
obligation to make them public (Article 228 sec. 2 in fine). Moreover, when 
the normal flow of information may be disrupted, such regulation could even, 
in certain specific conditions, serve as a medium of public information, access 
to which is guaranteed by Article 61 of the Constitution. All these arguments 
lead to the conclusion that the regulations in question should contain infor-
mation as to the reasons for the introduction of extraordinary measures. This 
may be done both in the content itself (for example in the preamble or intro-
ductory section) and in an appendix thereto, provided that it is an integral 
part, subject to publication together with its provisions. 
 It should also be borne in mind that the statute on the introduction of 
martial law or state of emergency are presented to the Sejm, which may re-
peal them. Careful supervision of these statutes requires a statement on the 
reasons for their issuance. However, this could be included in an explanatory 
memorandum,   which  would  not  be  so widely  published.  Therefore,  this  
                                                 
19 It would certainly be different if the extraordinary measures could be introduced for a peri-
od of two years, for example. 
20 It seems that the purpose of its ‘dramatic’ character is to mobilise society. 
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requirement is not a conclusive argument that a description must be included 
in the regulation itself. However, this clearly shows that the organs introduc-
ing martial law or a state of emergency are obliged to elaborate on the rea-
sons why they were introduced, although it is not necessary for them to be 
included in the regulation, at least not to their full extent. 
 The obligation to indicate in the regulation introducing the extraordinary 
measures the reasons for its issuance is provided for at the statutory level, 
which—following the above considerations—should be fully approved. The 
provisions of specific statutes on extraordinary measures do not specify this  
requirement in detail. Therefore, the description of the reasons for introduc-
tion of extraordinary measures need not be detailed. However, it seems that 
it should contain at least two elements. The first of these is a reference to the 
specific constitutional basis for the introduction of the extraordinary 
measures in question, and therefore to indicate explicitly that it is, for exam-
ple, due to the need to defend against aggression. Secondly, it is necessary to 
cite briefly the factual circumstances relating to this basis, thus, for example, 
to identify the catastrophe or the country which carried out the aggression 
against the territory of the Republic of Poland. However, it is not necessary 
for the regulation to indicate that ‘ordinary constitutional measures are inad-
equate’, although, as has already been mentioned, it is necessary to indicate 
this in the justification of the regulation, especially in the case of martial law 
or a state of emergency, when the Sejm supervises the legitimacy of its intro-
duction. 
 It would appear that the last element of the regulation introducing ex-
traordinary measures should be the indication of the date from which it takes 
effect. This is stems from the need to provide citizens with certainty as to the 
legal regime in force. It is obvious that martial law and states of emergency 
are a response to sudden events, so they should be introduced immediately, 
as soon as the regulation is announced. In such cases, it is no longer neces-
sary to indicate a specific date, as its validity will depend on the content of 
the regulation itself. This assertion is consistent with the provisions of the 
Acts on Martial Law and States of Emergency, in which it is explicitly stated 
that these come into force on the date the relevant regulation is published in 
the Journal of Laws.21 
 The situation is different in the case of a state of natural disaster. This is 
because catastrophes and their effects can sometimes be predicted some time 
in advance. The Council of Ministers should therefore have some discretion to 
determine the date on which the emergency measures take effect, so that a 
regulation on this matter can be announced in advance, which should result  
  
                                                 
21 It should be assumed that such publication will take place immediately after the regula-
tion is signed, hence the dates of these two actions should not differ. However, if they occurred at 
night, at the turn of two days, the President, anticipating that the regulation will be published 
after midnight, should indicate in the regulation the next day as the date of the extraordinary 
measures. 




in the authorities and citizens being better prepared for its implementation. 
This is reflected in Article 5 sec. 2 of the Act on States of Natural Disaster, in 
which it is stated that an obligatory element of the regulation introducing 
this extraordinary measure is the date of its introduction. Thus, even if the 
Council of Ministers wants the measures to come into force immediately, the 
Council cannot merely indicate that a state of natural disaster is being intro-
duced, but must specify the exact date on which it will occur—in this case, it 
will be the same as the date the regulation is published in the Journal of 
Laws. 
 Here it is worth mentioning in passing that it would not be acceptable to 
introduce any extraordinary measures, including a state of natural disaster, 
in a retroactive manner. This is a consequence of the binding principle of the 
rule of law and, above all, the resulting principle of citizens’ trust in the 
state.22 Thanks to this, the organs of public authority cannot try to legalise 
actions that were taken even to protect the State,23 especially since the late 
introduction of extraordinary measures will most often be a consequence of 
negligence on the part of those authorities. 
 It appears that regulations introducing extraordinary measures cannot 
contain any elements of content other than those referred to above. They 
cannot be used to regulate other matters, including those in some way related 
to extraordinary measures (such as compensation for damages resulting from 
the limitation of the freedoms and rights of the person and citizen when the 
measures were in force), or to determine under what conditions the extraor-
dinary measures are terminated ex lege. 
 The content of the other regulations referred to above stems from their 
very substance. Thus, a regulation terminating extraordinary measures only 
defines that same fact, referring to the regulation that implemented it. The 
same will apply to regulations extending a state of emergency or natural dis-
aster. The regulation amending the regulation that introduced the extraordi-
nary measures should, in turn, only contain provisions relating to the 
amendment of the specific regulations of the original act. 
 
 
IV. THE LEGAL NATURE OF REGULATIONS 
ON EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 
 
 The content of regulations on extraordinary measures is closely linked to 
the question of their legal nature. Even a superficial analysis of their content 
leads to the conclusion that for some of them it should be defined as mixed—
they have the characteristics of both individual and normative acts. This is 
certainly the case for regulations on extraordinary measures, since their very 
introduction would constitute individual acts—they do not create new norms,  
                                                 
22 This could lead to serious abuse, for example, the governing parties questioning the validi-
ty of lost elections which were held on first day after extraordinary measures were announced. 
23 Of course, in this case, the path to qualifying specific actions as taken in a state of higher 
necessity still remains open. 
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but only open the possibility of applying the specific regulations provided for 
in the specified circumstances. In addition, however, such regulations also 
delineate specific forms of limiting freedoms and rights. Although these forms 
were previously provided for in the relevant statutes, it is only the regula-
tions that allow for their application. Regulations and statutes thus co-shape 
the norms that are binding in given situation in which extraordinary 
measures are introduced. There can be no doubt that these norms, recon-
structed on the basis of the content of regulations and statutes, are of a gen-
eral and abstract nature—they are addressed to entities which are not dis-
tinguished with regard to their identity and they express replicable rules of 
behaviour. This means that such regulations are normative in this respect. 
These legal acts, taken as a whole, should therefore be referred to as mixed or 
hybrid acts. 24 
 It is clear that regulations extending and terminating extraordinary 
measures will be individual acts. However, there is also the question of 
whether they would also be normative in nature, since they indirectly affect 
the temporal application of the norms expressed in the regulation on emer-
gency measures. It would seem that this indirectness entails that they cannot 
be classed as normative acts—they do not repeal or extend the validity of 
certain norms, but merely cause them to be no longer fulfilled (a terminating 
regulation) or their fulfilment to take more time (an extending regulation). 
Therefore, these regulations should only be counted as acts of law applica-
tion. 
 The fourth type of regulation concerning extraordinary measures, namely 
amending regulations, are of a purely normative nature. They merely change 
the content of the provisions of the emergency measures. The nature of these 
legal acts is therefore analogous to other acts that amend normative acts. 
 
 
V. SUPERVISING THE LAWFULNESS OF REGULATIONS 
ON EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 
 
 The last research problem signalled in the introduction is the question of 
supervising the lawfulness of regulations on extraordinary measures. Alt-
hough in principle the Constitution does not regulate this issue explicitly, it 
seems that relevant constitutional norms can be interpreted on the basis of 
some of its provisions. 
 The supervision of some regulations on emergency measures is directly 
provided for in Article 231 of the Constitution, according to which regulations 
on the introduction of martial law or a state of emergency shall be submitted  
                                                 
24 See M. Brzeziński, Stany nadzwyczajne w polskich konstytucjach, Warsaw 2007: 187. In 
this respect, it is possible to see an analogy with a resolution on the appointment of an inquiry 
committee. The Constitutional Tribunal stated that this act is mixed—with regard to the scope 
in which it appoints a specific committee, it has the characteristics of an individual act, while to 
the extent it defines general and abstract principles of its activity, it is a normative act (see the 
judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 September 2006, U 4/06, OTK ZU, Series A, no. 8, 
item 109). 




to the Sejm, which may annul them by an absolute majority of votes. Alt-
hough this provision does not specify the criteria to be followed by the Sejm in 
this respect, it is clear that the grounds for repealing the regulations in ques-
tion may include their unlawfulness. As has already been mentioned, similar 
parliamentary scrutiny should be given to regulations that amend regula-
tions introducing martial law or a state of emergency. 
 The supervision of some of the regulations in question is also provided for 
in Article 230 sec. 2 and the second sentence of Article 232 of the Constitu-
tion. According to these provisions, a state of emergency and a state of natu-
ral disaster may be extended only with the consent of the Sejm. This means 
that such regulations are subject to review before they enter into force. It is 
clear that the unlawful nature of the proposed regulation may be one of the 
grounds for refusing to grant an extension to the extraordinary measures.25 
 Besides the cases mentioned above, the law does not expressly provide for 
the possibility of challenging extraordinary measures with erga omnes effects. 
It does not seem, however, that the review of their lawfulness is completely 
ruled out altogether. In this regard, particular attention should be paid to 
Article 188 sec. 3 of the Constitution, which indicates that the Constitutional 
Tribunal adjudicates on the ‘the conformity of legal provisions issued by cen-
tral State organs’ with higher level normative acts. Thus, if any act contains 
normative elements and is issued by a central State organ, it is subject to the 
review of the Constitutional Tribunal26. As has already been indicated, nor-
mative elements include regulations introducing extraordinary measures and 
regulations amending such acts. Since they are issued by the President or the 
Council of Ministers, and therefore central State organs, they are subject to 
the control of the Constitutional Tribunal.27 
 Since regulations introducing extraordinary measures are mixed in na-
ture, only those parts that contain normative elements are subject to the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s review. The issue of examining the regulations in 
question from the perspective of norms of procedure and competence is prob-
lematic.28 Prima facie, the whole act would thus necessarily be reviewed and 
a  negative  ruling  in  this  respect  would  result  in the regulation losing its  
  
                                                 
25 In practice, such a refusal should most often result in a different assessment of whether 
there are circumstances determining the admissibility of extending the extraordinary measures. 
In such a case, the Sejm, stating that there is no legal basis for such extension, will question not 
only the legitimacy, but also the lawfulness of the President's regulation. 
26 See L. Garlicki, Uwagi do art. 188, in: idem (ed.), op. cit., vol. 5, Warsaw 2007: 10 and 21. 
27 K. Prokop arrived at similar conclusions (see, idem, op. cit.: 30). 
28 According to Article 68 of the Act of 30 November 2016, on the Organisation and Procedure 
of the Constitutional Tribunal [Ustawa o organizacji i trybie postępowania przed Trybunałem 
Konstytucyjnym] (JL RP, item 2072): ‘When deciding on the compliance of a normative act [...] 
with the Constitution, the Tribunal shall examine both the content of such an act [...], as well as 
the competence and observance of the procedure required by the law to issue the act’. Although 
this norm was explicitly expressed only at the statutory level, it implicitly follows from the provi-
sions of the Constitution. 
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legal force, and this would lead to the extraordinary measures being termi-
nated by a ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal. However, such an effect 
would be contrary to the Constitution, which does not provide that individual 
acts are subject to the review of this body, including decisions on the intro-
duction of extraordinary measures. It appears that this problem can be solved 
by assuming that the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal can only have an 
impact on the normative element of such regulations. Thus, even if the Tri-
bunal finds that a regulation was issued in breach of rules of procedure or 
competence, it can only deprive the normative provisions of their binding 
force. In such a case, the extraordinary measures would remain in force, but 
no limitations on human rights specified in the extraordinary measures 
would be binding. This would then require an immediate revision of the regu-
lation,29 which would redefine this issue.  
 At this point it is worth pointing out that such problems do not occur in 
the case of amending regulations. These are purely normative in nature and  
are therefore entirely subject the Constitutional Tribunal’s review. Thus, a 
ruling finding that there has been an infringement of the procedure or of the 
competence necessary for issuing such a regulation would result in the com-
plete loss of the regulation’s binding force. 
 There does not seem to be any other way of monitoring the lawfulness of 
such regulations with erga omnes effects. In particular, they are not subject 
to review by administrative courts. The introduction, termination or exten-
sion of extraordinary measures essentially involves modifying the basic prin-
ciples of the State’s functioning—so it is difficult to classify actions of this 
level of importance as falling under the scope of public administration. Un-
questionably, the President and the Council of Ministers, when taking deci-
sions on matters of extraordinary measures, do not act as administrative 
bodies, but as central State organs exercising their powers in the sphere of 
the constitutionally conferred imperium.30 
 An interesting issue is whether the regulations in question, to the extent 
that they are not subject to the review of the Constitutional Tribunal, could, 
at the behest of the ordinary legislator, become subject to review by the Su-
preme Court. A specific legal basis for this could be Article 183 sec. 2 of the 
Constitution, in which it is indicated that the Supreme Court carries out ac-
tivities other than the supervision of common and military courts, as speci-
fied in the Constitution and statutes. It is not clear how much room for ma-
noeuvre this provision grants to the ordinary legislator. The creation of 
mechanisms for binding judicial review of the lawfulness of regulations on 
extraordinary measures would without a doubt significantly modify relations 
between the organs of public authority. However, this would only serve to 
protect the rule of law, which is one of the fundamental principles of the  
  
                                                 
29 And the principles for activity by public authorities, if this issue also falls within the scope 
of the regulations under discussion. 
30 A similar argument in the area of refusal to acknowledge the President’s activity in the ar-
ea of appointing judges for administrative activities is used by administrative courts (see, for 
example, the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of October 16, 2012, I OSK 1879/12). 




constitutional order and which, by its very nature, does not contradict other 
norms, principles or constitutional values. It would therefore be difficult to 
find adequate arguments against such a solution in the Constitution. It is 
therefore necessary to argue in favour of its admissibility. 
 A separate issue is the possibility of incidental supervision of the lawful-
ness of regulations on extraordinary measures by judges in a specific case. In 
accordance with Article 178 sec. 1 of the Constitution, judges in the exercise 
of their office shall be subject only to the Constitution and statutes.31 This 
entails that they are not subject to acts of a lower rank if they are incompati-
ble with the Constitution and statutes, which results in the matter being 
settled without them or,32 alternatively, in such an act being referred to the 
Constitutional Tribunal as a query regarding a point of law. There seems to 
be no reason to suppose that these rules cannot also apply to regulations on 
extraordinary measures (whether they contain normative elements or are 
devoid of them).33 The specific nature of these regulations does not in any 
way preclude the fact that, in the context of a specific case, their unlawful-
ness can be established, and the matter can be resolved without them34. In 





 The above reflections indicate that the issue of regulations on extraordi-
nary measures, despite the seemingly laconic nature of the provisions con-
cerning them in the Constitution, has been regulated quite precisely at the 
constitutional level. The role of the ordinary legislator is, in principle, only to 
elaborate on some of the issues discussed above. 
 It seems that the analysed constitutional regulations deserve approval. 
The  regulations  concerning  extraordinary  measures  have been constructed  
 
 
                                                 
31 An analogous solution with regard to the judges of the State Tribunal is included in Article 
199 sec. 3 of the Constitution. 
32 See, e.g., L. Garlicki, Uwagi do art. 178, in: idem (ed), op. cit., vol. 4, Warsaw 2005: 15–16; 
R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, O formach kontroli konstytucyjności prawa przez sądy, Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 70(2), 2008: 13. 
33 The possibility of the courts incidentally questioning unlawful individual acts originating 
from central State organs was confirmed in the resolution of the Supreme Court of 31 May 2017. 
(I KZP 4/17, OSNKW 2017, no. 7, item 37). 
34 For an alternative view, see K. Prokop, op. cit.: 30. 
35 This could be the case, for example, in the case of the President or members of the govern-
ment, who unjustly, in bad faith introduced extraordinary measure in order to take actions that 
would normally be prohibited (for example related to harassment of the opposition). In such a 
state of affairs, the State Tribunal (or a common court) should be able to state that the extraor-
dinary measures were introduced in violation of the law and, consequently, settle the matter as if 
the actions taken by the accused took place outside the extraordinary measures. It is worth 
noting here that part of the doctrine wrongly rejects the possibility of the judiciary examining the 
legality of the introduction of extraordinary measures—see, for example L. Mażewski, Kilka 
uwag o instytucji stanu nadzwyczajnego, Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy 82(2), 2009: 37. 
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correctly and can therefore be expected to fulfil their purpose, should they 
ever need to be applied. 
 
Mateusz Radajewski  






THE REGULATIONS ON EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 
IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND: 
THEIR CONTENT, LEGAL NATURE 
AND THE SUPERVISION OF THEIR LAWFULNESS 
 
S u m m a r y  
 
 The objective of the article is to: identify all kinds of regulations related to extraordinary 
measures (that is legal acts that affect the validity and content of particular extraordinary 
measures); to reconstruct the elements of their content and define their legal nature, along with 
the means of supervising their lawfulness. In the article four types of such regulations will be 
distinguished: regulations introducing extraordinary measures, regulations which extend and 
terminate them, as well as regulations that amend the regulation introducing extraordinary 
measures. Their content and legal character are varied. The most complex is the regulation 
introducing extraordinary measures, since it is both an individual and normative act. The author 
concludes that the analysed regulations are subject to the review of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
In the remaining scope, the possibility of their supervision by the judiciary is limited; however, it 
is possible to question them incidentally before the courts and the State Tribunal. The reflections 
lead to the formulation of a positive assessment of the constitutional provisions related to the 
issue under analysis.  
 
 
